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ARGUMENT
I.

Appellee Thomas Boyle’s Brief is Procedurally Defective And Exceeds the
Scope of the Grant of Certiorari.
A.

Appellee’s Brief Fails to Comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

Appellee Thomas D. Boyle’s (“Boyle”) Brief is procedurally deficient because he
fails to include citations to the record for the vast majority of the factual statements in his
brief. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that “[a]ll statements of facts and
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7); see also id. 24(e)
(requiring references to be “made to the pages of the original record” and references to
transcripts to include both the sequential record number on the cover sheet and the
individual page cite within the transcript). “The briefing requirements of rule 24 exist for
good reason. ‘[T]he requirements of the rule serve to focus the briefs, thus promoting
more accuracy and efficiency in the processing of appeals.’” Van Den Eikhof v. Vista
Sch., 2012 UT App 125, ¶ 3, 278 P.3d 622 (citation omitted).
Boyle substantially disregarded these requirements. Boyle includes no record
cites for the first three (3) pages of his Statement of the Case. (See Brief of Appellee, p.
4-6.) His entire Statement of the Case contains only five (5) record cites. (See id., p. 48.) Several of Boyle’s citations to hearing transcripts in his Argument also do not
provide page citations within the transcripts as required by Rule 24(e), leaving to
Appellant Clyde Snow & Sessions, P.C. (“Clyde Snow”), or this Court the burden of
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combing through lengthy transcripts to determine whether the statements made by Boyle
are supported by the record. (See id., p. 25, 33 n. 5.) Other times, when Boyle does cite
to the record, the cite provided does not support the factual contention made.1
Notably, in several of the instances in which Boyle fails to provide a record cite,
his statements are false. For example, Boyle claims:
 “Clyde Snow was discharged by Woodson in 2010 after declining to provide a
budget to litigate her case and firing her lead attorney (Boyle) who wanted to
proceed with depositions as she wished.” (Brief of Appellee, p. 13). This
statement is not only unsupported by Boyle, it is contradicted by the record. R.
4877-78.
 Clyde Snow “declin[ed] to fund [Woodson’s] litigation, even to take a single
deposition and . . . fire[d] her lead attorney” in order to “shift the effort and risk of
the Woodson case back to Woodson, allowing Clyde Snow to sit on the sidelines,
hedge its bets and wait for a free ride.” (Id., p. 19). This statement is again
unsupported by Boyle and is contradicted by the evidence presented to, and
findings made by the trial court following the evidentiary hearing, including but
not limited to, that Clyde Snow invested 2,761.2 hours of professional time in the
Woodson matter, under Boyle’s direction, and that “[t]here are no facts in the
record that support that Clyde Snow ever abandoned the representation of Mrs.
Woodson.” R. 4819, 4829, 6324-25; see also Appellant’s Brief, Add. E, at p. 311(R. 6324-6332).
 Boyle also asserts, again without record support, that Clyde Snow “objected to
Woodson’s settlement agreement with CEC [the underlying Defendant].” (Id., p.
20). This statement is not true, and that Boyle could not find record support for it
is compelling evidence that he knows it is untrue.
This Court has repeatedly confirmed that it “need not, and will not, consider any
facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record.” Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat. Life
1

For example, on page 6 of his Brief, Boyle claims that “[t]he record shows Prince
Yeates had given Boyle an assignment of rights,” for which he cited R. 5082. (Brief of
Appellee, p. 6). That record cite is to a page of Prince Yeates & Geldzahler’s (“PYG”)
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Interplead Funds, which does not reference the
purported assignment, let alone include it.
2

Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). “The requirement that all factual contentions be
accompanied by a record citation is particularly important because ‘[o]n appeal, we are
limited to the findings of fact made by the trial court and may not find new facts or
reweigh the evidence[.]” Van Den Eikhof, 2012 UT App 125 at ¶ 5 n. 1 (citation
omitted). Failure to cite to the record, or providing cites that “are actually inconsistent
with what is in the record,” is not adequate briefing and is grounds to strike a brief or
disregard the merits of an argument in an appellate brief. See id. (emphasis in original).
Clyde Snow respectfully requests that the Court disregard Boyle’s unsupported and
inaccurate factual statements and, to the extent the Court deems appropriate, strike
Boyle’s brief in whole or in part.
B.

The Court Should Disregard Boyle’s Challenges to the Merits of the
District Court’s Decision Regarding Distribution of the Interpleaded
Res As Beyond the Scope of the Grant of Certiorari.

Boyle includes a number of arguments that purport to challenge the merits of the
district court’s rulings with respect to the distribution of the fees interpleaded and
deposited with the Court. For example, Boyle argues: (a) the district court erred by
refusing to consider Boyle’s employment claims against Clyde Snow (Brief of Appellee,
p. 36-37); (b) the district court erred in awarding the entire interpleader res to Clyde
Snow following the evidentiary hearing, including because Clyde Snow was not entitled
“to be paid the value of PYG’s services under its contract with Woodson,” (Id., p. 19-20);
and (c) Clyde Snow breached its fiduciary obligations to Woodson in pursuing its claim
to recover fees under its contingency fee agreement with Woodson. (Id., 19-20.)
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These issues, going to the merits of issues before the district court, are well
beyond the issues identified in this Court’s grant of the petition for Certiorari, (see Order
Granting Petition, p. 1), or considered by the Court of Appeals in its decision below. See
Boyle v. Clyde Snow & Sessions, P.C. 2016 UT App 114, 378 P.3d 98. These arguments
should therefore be disregarded. See, e.g., State v. Loveless, 2010 UT 24, ¶ 1 n.1, 232
P.3d 510 (declining to review an issue that is “beyond the scope of the question upon
which [the Supreme Court] granted certiorari,” and that “was not addressed by the court
of appeals.”).
II.

The Court of Appeals’ Intervention and Waiver Holdings Are Inconsistent
with Established Authority and the Circumstances of This Case
Demonstrating That No Party Objected to Clyde Snow’s Participation.
Clyde Snow addressed the errors in the Utah Court of Appeals’ intervention and

waiver holdings at length in its opening Brief, including the Utah Court of Appeals’ (a)
failure to provide the proper deference to the district court’s rulings on the timeliness of
Clyde Snow’s requests to participate in the action and waiver, (b) undue reliance on the
distinguishable circumstances of Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, 989 P.2d 1073; and (c)
the disastrous effects of the Court of Appeals’ decision upon contingency-fee lawyers’
ability to recover fees under an attorney’s lien. (See Appellant’s Brief, p. 18-30.) Clyde
Snow will not repeat the details of these arguments, but instead will limit its response to
addressing the misconceptions in Boyle’s arguments.
Before veering off course to argue about issues not before this Court, such as the
validity of Clyde Snow’s attorney lien, Boyle adopts the erroneous reasoning of the Court
of Appeals to argue that Clyde Snow never became a party to the action because it did
4

not timely file a formal motion to intervene and that there was no waiver of the formal
intervention requirement. However, these arguments miss the point, and ignore the
actual events of this case pursuant to which the district court allowed Clyde Snow to
participate as a party for the limited purpose of enforcing its lien.
In July of 2010, shortly after Ms. Woodson’s representation transferred from
Clyde Snow to PYG, Clyde Snow filed a Notice of Attorney’s Lien. R. 1031-33. The
notice did not create the lien, however. Rather, by statute, Clyde Snow’s attorney’s lien
“commence[d] at the time of employment of the attorney by the client.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-2-7(3). Further, “[a]ny person who takes an interest in any property. . . that is
subject to an attorney's lien with actual or constructive knowledge of the attorney's lien,
takes the interest subject to the attorney's lien.” Id. § 38-2-7(8). There is no evidence in
the record of any party or counsel challenging or objecting to the content of Clyde
Snow’s Notice of Lien. In fact, in recognition of the lien, PYG paid Clyde Snow the
costs Clyde Snow incurred during its representation of Ms. Woodson. R. 6525, at p. 67.
Subsequently, the parties to the Woodson case entered into a confidential
settlement agreement to resolve the matter in June of 2013, and sought immediate
dismissal. R. 4661-68. Upon learning of the settlement and the filing of the stipulated
dismissal papers, Clyde Snow filed a Restated Notice of Attorney’s Lien and Objection to
Dismissal of Action on June 28, 2013. R. 4669-73. The filing of this Restated Notice of
Lien was authorized by Utah law, see Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7(5) and (6), and leave of
court was not required for this filing. See id. Also, prior to dismissal of the Woodson
case, on July 8, 2013, a Notice of Appearance of Counsel was filed on behalf of Clyde
5

Snow. R. 4674-75. This Notice of Appearance stated that counsel was “appearing as
counsel of record for the law firm of Clyde Snow & Sessions for purposes of enforcing”
the attorney’s lien. Id. Given the appearance of counsel on Clyde Snow’s behalf and
the filing of the Restated Notice of Lien, the district court was not in a position to
disregard the lien and dismiss the Woodson case unilaterally in disregard of the lien.
Clyde Snow’s Notice of Appearance signaled Clyde Snow’s intent to intervene to
enforce its attorney’s lien before the case was dismissed. In recognition of this, the
district court, on its own initiative, noticed and conducted a hearing on the Motion to
Dismiss the Woodson case in light of Clyde Snow’s Objection on July 15, 2013. R.
4677-78; 6528, at pp.5-11, 16-18. The sole issue before the district court at the July 2013
hearing was whether the court should retain jurisdiction to resolve Clyde Snow’s lien
claim. Id.
No party objected to this hearing, to Clyde Snow’s filing of the Restated Notice of
Attorney’s Lien, or to the appearance of counsel in the action on Clyde Snow’s behalf.
Id. No party objected to Clyde Snow’s participation in the hearing. Id. (See also
Appellant’s Brief, p. 26-27.) Nor were there any objections to the district court’s order
at the July 2013 hearing directing Clyde Snow, PYG and Boyle to engage in mediation
regarding the attorney’s lien. Id. Moreover, all affected persons, including both Ms.
Woodson and the underlying defendants (collectively, “CEC”), approved the district
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court’s July 22, 2013 written order reflecting the court’s rulings at the July 15, 2013
hearing.2 R. 4683-86.
At that point, two things occurred relative to question of intervention. First, the
district court exercised its discretion to treat Clyde Snow’s Notice of Appearance,
Objection to Dismissal, Restated Notice of Lien, and statements during the July, 2013,
hearing as timely requests to intervene or participate for the purpose of resolving its
attorney’s lien. The district court confirmed in its July 1, 2014 Order denying Boyle’s
Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Clyde Snow’s Purported Attempt to Intervene (“Motion
to Dismiss”) that this is what it intended to accomplish in July of 2013. R. 6285. It is
undisputed that all of the aforementioned filings, and Clyde Snow’s appearance and
requests at the July 2013 hearing for the district court to retain jurisdiction occurred
before the entry of final judgment.
This fact alone takes this case outside of Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, 989 P.2d
1073, heavily relied upon by Boyle and the Court of Appeals to argue the Clyde Snow’s
efforts to intervene were untimely.3 Seeking intervention prior to entry of final judgment
is timely. See Supernova Media, Inc. v. Pia Anderson Dorius Reynard & Moss, LLC,
2013 UT 7, ¶ 24, 297 P.3d 599 (“Generally, a motion to intervene is timely if it is filed
2

Boyle argues that Ms. Woodson and CEC did not approve the district court’s July 22,
2013 Order of Dismissal with Prejudice and Preservation of Attorney Lien (“July 22
Order”). (Appellee’s Brief, p. 16). This is not true. The July 22 Order was prepared by
CEC’s counsel. R. 4683-86. It was approved to form by both Boyle (then with PYG), as
counsel for Woodson, and Jeffery Williams, as counsel for Clyde Snow. Id.
3

See Ostler, 1999 UT 99 at ¶ 9 (noting the attorney at issue made no filings until after
the trial court “had dismissed [the client’s] action with prejudice.”).
7

before the ‘final settlement of all issues by all parties,’ and before entry of judgment or
dismissal.” (Emphasis added)).4 And, as detailed in Clyde Snow’s opening brief, Clyde
Snow could not have sought to intervene to enforce its lien at any earlier point in time
because its right to compensation under its contingency fee agreement did not ripen until
settlement, and its lien rights then attached as a matter of law to the settlement proceeds
and fees paid to PYG. (See Appellant’s Brief, p. 19-21.)
Second, the parties waived the need for Clyde Snow to formally intervene by not
objecting to: (a) Clyde Snow’s filing of the Notice of Appearance, (b) Clyde Snow’s
filing of the Objection to Dismissal and Restated Notice of Lien, (c) Clyde Snow’s
participation in the July, 2013, hearing and requests during that hearing for the district
court to retain jurisdiction to resolve the attorney’s lien; and (d) the substantial process
relating to the attorney’s lien that occurred between July, 2013, and the entry of the final
judgment, following the evidentiary hearing on the interpleader in July of 2014. See, e.g.,
Ostler, 1999 UT 99 at ¶ 7 (noting the general rule that parties can waive the intervention
requirements under Rule 24 and any objection “informal intervention”); see also Pub.
Serv. Co. of Colorado v. Blue River Irr. Co., 753 P.2d 737, 740 (Colo. 1988) (viewing a
nonparty’s “filing of an entry of appearance as analogous to the filing of a defective
motion to intervene,” and noting that “[w]hen a technically defective motion to intervene
is filed, the existing parties may waive their right to object to the intervention by failing

4

Even the entry of judgment does not cutoff the ability to intervene under federal law.
See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 395-396 (1977) (noting with
approval that there are “several decisions of the federal courts permitting post-judgment
intervention for the purpose of appeal,” and citing authorities).
8

to make timely objections”). Simply put, nobody – neither Ms. Woodson, CEC, Boyle,
nor PYG – raised any timely objections to Clyde Snow’s participation. That is waiver,5
as determined by the district court. R. 6285. Moreover, the complete lack of prejudice
to any of the underlying parties, or to Boyle, from Clyde Snow’s participation at the
hearing and to the district court’s decision to retain jurisdiction to resolve the attorney’s
lien in the existing action, further supports the actions of the district court on these
issues.6
Furthermore, Boyle’s reliance on the Petition to Nullify Attorney’s Lien,
purportedly filed on behalf of Ms. Woodson in August of 2013, does not help Boyle; it
hurts his position. Arguments concerning the merits of the lien, including all issues
associated with the validity, enforceability and value of the lien can only be resolved
once the court assumes jurisdiction over the lien. To the extent the Petition to Nullify
Lien was filed on Ms. Woodson’s behalf, it constitutes yet a further act of acquiescence,
by a party to the underlying action, to the district court’s retention of jurisdiction over the
lien issues.
5

See, e.g., State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993) (“As we have repeatedly held,
failure to object constitutes waiver of the objection.”).
6

See Utah R. Civ. P. 61 (setting forth the “harmless error rule” as requiring “[t]he court
at every stage of the proceedings must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”); accord Batt v. State, 28 Utah
2d 417, 421–22, 503 P.2d 855 (1972) (observing, “when the parties have had their
entitlement of an opportunity to fully present their evidence and arguments to a court and
jury, who have arrived at a verdict and judgment, this court should be reluctant to
interfere therewith, and should not do so merely because of imperfections or
irregularities. The verdict should not be disturbed unless there was some substantial error
so that the party was deprived of a fair trial and there is a reasonable likelihood that in its
absence there would have been a different result.”).
9

Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred by determining that Clyde Snow failed to
become a party and that the district court improperly retained jurisdiction, given the lack
of objection of any party. Its decision should be reversed.
III.

The Establishment of the Interpleader Provided an Independent
Jurisdictional Basis for the District Court’s Judgment.
A.

The Court of Appeals Erred by Disregarding the Effect the Deposit of
the Attorney Fees Had Upon the District Court’s Jurisdiction.

As detailed in Clyde Snow’s opening Brief, any possible lingering requirement for
Clyde Snow to file a formal motion to intervene was further extinguished when PYG,
with the consent of both Clyde Snow and Boyle, deposited the fees at issue with the
district court to establish the interpleader proceeding. (See Appellant’s Brief, p. 30-38.)
Once PYG deposited the fees into the district court there was no reason for Clyde Snow
to intervene in the underlying action because the district court had jurisdiction over the
interpled fees. (See id.) Instead, Clyde Snow filed a complaint against the interpleaded
res held by the court, asserting its claims to recover against the stake. R. 5289-5466.
The district court recognized the effect of the interpleading of funds upon the
intervention issue in its July 1, 2014 order denying Boyle’s Motion to Dismiss. R. 6285.
And, the district court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the fees at issue is also supported
by the authorities cited in Clyde Snow’s opening brief that considered similar issues.
(Appellant’s Brief, p. 33-38.) For example, as held by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York in a well-reasoned decision: regardless of how
the “procedural steps” leading up to the deposit of fees in the court “may be rationalized,”
the deposit of the fees into the court’s registry established an independent and
10

“fundamental” jurisdictional basis in the district court to “exercise the ‘right to say’
(jurisdiction) where the fees belong,” and which creates a “basic obligation, inherent in
the court's very functioning as a court” that prevents a court from “simply cast[ing] the
money away without deciding who has a right to take it.” Reliable Marine Boiler Repair
Inc. v. Sum of $35,000.00, 270 F.Supp. 1017, 1020-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
These principles are very much in line with Utah’s own formulation of the concept
of subject matter jurisdiction.7 Utah, similar to other jurisdictions, determines whether a
court has subject matter jurisdiction by “focus[ing] on whether the court has authority
over the general class of cases to which the particular case at issue belongs, rather than on
the specific facts presented by any individual case.” In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011
UT 38, ¶ 33, 266 P.3d 702. The district court has subject matter jurisdiction to establish
and hear an interpleader proceeding to resolve competing claims to attorney fees
stemming from the settlement of a contingency fee case and to render decisions affecting
the disbursement of the fees at issue in the interpleader. See Utah Const. art. VIII, § 5
(stating “the district court has shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or statute.”); Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102(1) (same). Rule
22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly authorizes “interpleader” as a general
class of cases the district court may hear. Utah R. Civ. P. 22.
As detailed in Clyde Snow’s opening brief, p. 30-38, the Court of Appeals
departed from these principles in its decision by disregarding the effect the deposit of fees
into the court had upon the district court’s jurisdiction with respect to those fees. Boyle,
7

Clyde Snow is unable to locate any Utah authority addressing this precise issue.
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for his part, has failed to respond to this argument and this issue as raised by this Court, 8
which provides an independent basis for the reversal of the Court of Appeals.
B.

Boyle’s Argument that He Was Not A Claimant In the Interpleader
Proceeding is Unfounded.

Boyle denies that he was a “claimant” to the interpleader proceeding and argues
that Clyde Snow was the only party to the interpleader proceeding. (Appellee’s Brief, p.
26-32). Although the reasoning behind this assertion is unclear from Boyle’s brief and
difficult to follow, it appears that Boyle rests this assertion upon his contentions that (a)
he was never served with process in the interpleader action; (b) the trial court refused to
adjudicate Boyle’s claims against Clyde Snow and PYG; and (c) Ms. Woodson was never
named a claimant. (Id.) There are many problems with Boyle’s factually inaccurate and
highly perplexing arguments that Clyde Snow will focus only upon a few of them.
First, Boyle’s current position as to his status as a claimant and party to the
interpleader, as well as to the procedure employed by trial court in establishing the
interpleader, stands in stark contrast to the position he took before the Court of Appeals.
In his Supplemental Brief, for example, Boyle claimed:
Unlike the attorney in Utah Down Syndrome, Thomas D. Boyle, the
Appellant in this case, is a named claimant in an interpleader action,
which the lower court determined was properly filed. Unlike the
attorney in Utah Down Syndrome, the Appellant in this case was
8

Boyle, like the Court of Appeals, cited no authority for this proposition and it is not
stated in Rule 22. See Utah R. Civ. P. 22. Furthermore, Boyle ignores that PYG filed a
motion to support its deposit of the fees in the court, which is authorized by Rule 67 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, because PYG disclaimed any interest in
those fees, there was no reason for PYG to file a complaint asserting any claim to those
fees. The actual claimants, Clyde Snow and Boyle, each filed pleadings setting forth
their claims to the interpleader res. R. 5104-5183, 5289-5466, 5509-5585.
12

served with process and affirmatively brought into the case as a
claimant. This appeal stems from Boyle’s status as a party claimant,
giving this Court proper appellate jurisdiction over this matter.
(Boyle’s Supplemental Brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, p. 2, see also id. p. 5-6.)
Similarly, Boyle’s contention that he “did not consent to the interpleader” in the
district court is completely inaccurate. (Appellee’s Brief, p. 32.) The record establishes
that Boyle did not oppose PYG’s motion to deposit fees and establish the interpleader. R.
5104-83. Boyle further stated: “Should the Court rule that the correct sum to
interpleaded is in fact $XXXX.00, Boyle does not intend to contest the issue further[.]”
R. 5106. Boyle’s acquiescence to the interpleader proceeding is further evidenced by his
consistent participation in that proceeding, including at the evidentiary hearing he
requested, demonstrated in the record. R. 5050-51.
The law does not permit Boyle to now change his position before this Court, and
such efforts should be rejected. See Hanson v. Gen. Builders Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d
143, 389 P.2d 61, 61 (1964) (“[T]he rules will not justify or condone an expression by
defendant of satisfaction, – without a word of objection, with the trial court's ruling as a
matter of law . . ., only to change its position when it loses, otherwise it would have the
enviable effect of permitting a litigant to blow hot and cold, depending on the outcome . .
. .”); see also Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 17, 164 P.3d 366 (observing that that
“invited error” doctrine precludes “appellate review” of a claimed “error committed at
trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error,” and that under the
doctrine “parties are not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the
benefit of objecting on appeal.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotations and citation omitted)).
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Second, Boyle’s argument that he was not a claimant because the district court
refused to consider his potential claims against Clyde Snow and PYG, reveals a
fundamental misapprehension about the nature of an interpleader proceeding.
The funds deposited into the district court were fees collected by PYG pursuant to
PYG’s contingency fee agreement with Ms. Woodson. R. 5073-85; 6325. The
interpleader res or stake constituted a portion of the overall fee collected by PYG under
its contingency fee agreement with Woodson. Thus, only claims to recover a portion of
the fees collected by PYG could be presented and resolved in the context of the
interpleader. See, e.g., In re Millennium Multiple Employer Welfare Ben. Plan, 772
F.3d 634, 640 (10th Cir. 2014) (“‘In an interpleader action, ... jurisdiction extends only to
the fund deposited with the court,’” and ‘“the subject matter of the action is not a set of
facts, a transaction or occurrence which gives rise to the litigation, but a specific
identified fund or property. Claims must not only relate to that property, but be asserted
against it....’” (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted)). Stated otherwise,
claims against or between and among the parties, as extensively argued by Boyle, are
irrelevant and beyond the interpleader. See United States v. Chapman, 281 F.2d 862, 867
(10th Cir. 1960) (“Right to recover from the [interpleader] fund must be based on the
strength of a claimant's title and not on the weakness of the title of another claimant.”).
Once the district court received the interpleaded fees with the consent of the
parties, the district court’s jurisdiction necessarily wrapped around that res of fees. As
established by the authorities set forth in Clyde Snow’s opening brief, p. 36-37, the
district court’s jurisdiction over the fees on deposit with the court was independent of any
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other process or procedure that occurred prior to that deposit, and continued until the
funds were disbursed. See Reliable Marine, 270 F.Supp. at 1020-21; Garrett v. McRee,
201 F.2d 250, 253 (10th Cir. 1953); accord In re Millennium, 772 F.3d at 642. By failing
to adhere to these jurisdictional principals, the Court of Appeals’ erred.
Third, Boyle argues that the interpleader proceeding was improper because Ms.
Woodson was never named a claimant. Ms. Woodson was not separately named as a
claimant to the fees because she had no claim to recover from the interpleader stake
because it was limited to fees collected by PYG pursuant to its contingency fee
agreement with Woodson. R. 5073-85; 6325. She did not dispute, and to Clyde Snow’s
knowledge has never disputed, that PYG was entitled to collect the portion of money it
collected from the settlement amount as fees under its contingency fee agreement with
Ms. Woodson.
Additionally, Boyle claims he received an assignment of Ms. Woodson’s interests
in any claims to the fees at issue in Clyde Snow’s attorney’s lien before PYG deposited
those fees with the district court. (See R. 5706.) Thus, Boyle participated in the
interpleader proceeding before the trial court both in his individual capacity and as the
assignee of Ms. Woodson. Boyle’s arguments should therefore be rejected by this Court.
IV.

The Supreme Court has Independent Jurisdiction to Issue a Writ of
Certiorari to Review and Reverse the Court of Appeals’ Erroneous Opinion.
A.

Boyle Ignores this Court’s Original Jurisdiction Under the Utah
Constitution to Issue Writs of Certiorari Even In Favor of NonParties.

As set forth in Clyde Snow’s opening brief, this Court has original jurisdiction,
stemming from Article VIII, section 3 of the Utah Constitution, to issue a writ of
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certiorari to review and reverse an erroneous decision of the Court of Appeals, even if
Clyde Snow did not acquire formal party status through intervention, waiver or through
the establishment of the interpleader. (See Appellant’s Brief, p. 40-43.) Boyle’s does not
respond to the authorities and argument presented by Clyde Snow on this issue. Instead,
Boyle frames his argument around the concept of subject matter jurisdiction, including to
argue “[t]he Court of Appeals, as the one charged with reviewing the district court, has
the authority to review whether or not it has jurisdiction to hear the merits of an
argument, or if there was jurisdiction of the lower court . . . .,” for which point he cites a
law review article. (See Appellee’s Brief, p. 42-43.)
This is not responsive to the question presented on certiorari, which specifically
queried whether this Court has jurisdiction to issue of writ of certiorari to reverse or
vacate an erroneous Court of Appeals’ decision, if Clyde Snow “did not acquire party
status.” (Order Granting Petition, p. 1 (emphasis added).) As indicated, the authorities
cited by Clyde Snow in its opening brief identifying the writ of certiorari as an
extraordinary writ establish this Court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari in favor
of Clyde Snow even assuming arguendo it never became a formal party. (Appellant’s
Brief, p. 40-43.) There simply cannot be a ruling by any Utah court, including the Court
of Appeals, that is beyond this Court’s power of review under the Utah Constitution.
This is the purpose of the writ of certiorari, as a Constitutional creation, and why a writ of
certiorari is deemed to be an extraordinary writ. Where Boyle made no effort to rebut the
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controlling authorities cited by Clyde Snow, this Court should follow Clyde Snow’s
analysis to the extent this Court reaches this issue. 9
B.

Boyle Disregards this Court’s Precedent in Arguing that the Utah
Court of Appeals Had the Authority to Declare the District Court’s
Judgment Void and Reverse Its Decision.

Boyle claims, at p. 46-48, that the Utah Court of Appeals had the authority, even
after determining that Boyle was not party and had no right to appeal, to review the
district court’s jurisdiction, to declare the district court’s judgment to be void and to
reverse the district court’s decision and to remand for entry of an order consistent with its
opinion. See Boyle, 2016 UT App 114 at ¶ 23, 25. Boyle argues that the Court of
Appeals did not actually void any judgments of the district court, but only performed its
“duty” to “recognize a void judgment” already in the record. (Appellee’s Brief, p. 46,
48.) In support of this proposition, Boyle cites a number of authorities from other
jurisdictions. (Id. at 47-48.)
Notably, however, Boyle entirely ignores the controlling Utah authority on this
issue that contradicts his position. The Utah Court of Appeals’ actions in reviewing the
district court’s jurisdiction, declaring its judgments void and thereafter reversing the
9

Boyle makes a cursory attempt to claim that one must be a party to petition for a writ of
certiorari, for which he relies entirely on a misguided interpretation of federal authorities.
(Appellee’s Brief, p. 43.) Boyle’s federal authorities are inapplicable to the question at
bar regarding this Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under the Utah
Constitution, for which there is Utah precedent on point. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988), actually undermines
Boyle’s contention because the Marino Court did not refuse to consider the petition of
certiorari of a non-party on the basis it lacked jurisdiction, or even consider the issue for
which Boyle cites it. See 484 U.S. at 303-04. Rather, the Marino Court “granted
certiorari” to consider the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the appeal of non-parties. See
id at 304.
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district court decision on that basis after the Court of Appeals determined it lacked
appellate jurisdiction over Boyle’s appeal is inconsistent with this Court’s decisions in
Utah Down Syndrome Foundation, Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome Association, 2012 UT
86, 293 P.3d 241 and Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT
19, 110 P.3d 678.
Both Down Syndrome and Tremco involved direct appeals to the Utah Supreme
Court (rather than a writ of certiorari) by nonparties of orders entered against them. .
Down Syndrome, 2012 UT 86 at ¶¶ 5-6, 9-10, 12-13; Tremco, 2005 UT 19 at ¶ 10-11, 44,
46. In both cases, the Supreme Court determined that the nonparties had no appeal of
right, and dismissed their appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction because “‘[w]here an
appeal is not properly taken, this court lacks jurisdiction and we must dismiss.’” Down
Syndrome, 2012 UT 86 at ¶ 13 (quoting Tremco, 2005 UT 19 at ¶46) (further quotations
and citations omitted)). Importantly, in both cases, the Supreme Court left in place the
underlying orders entered by the district court against the nonparties; it did not declare
them void; it did not reverse them. See Down Syndrome, 2012 UT 86 at ¶11, 32; Tremco,
2005 UT 19 at ¶¶ 45-46. Indeed, in Tremco, this Court left the order at issue in place
because it “lack[ed] jurisdiction to review it,” even though this Court expressed “serious
concerns regarding the validity of the supplemental order” at issue. Tremco, 2005 UT 19
at ¶ 45.
These authorities are dispositive of Boyle’s argument and establish that the Court
of Appeals erred. Upon determining that Boyle was not a party, the Court of Appeals
was left with a single option: to dismiss his appeal. By going beyond this to review the
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validity of the district court’s judgment, including to declaring it void and to reverse it,
the Court of Appeals erred. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ decision must be
reversed and vacated, even if this Court concludes Clyde Snow was never made a formal
party.
CONCLUSION
For each and all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should issue the writ of
certiorari to the Court of Appeals, and reverse or vacate the Court of Appeals’ Opinion.
DATED this 23rd day of January 2017.
NELSON CHRISTENSEN
HOLLINGWORTH & WILLIAMS
/s/ Jeffery S. Williams
Jeffery S. Williams
Attorney for Clyde Snow & Sessions,
P.C.
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